Dalhousie Law Journal
Volume 8

Issue 3

Article 3

10-1-1984

Crime at Sea: Admiralty Sessions and the Background to Later
Colonial Jurisdiction
M. J. Prichard

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.schulichlaw.dal.ca/dlj
Part of the Admiralty Commons

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative
Works 4.0 License.
Recommended Citation
M. J. Prichard, “Crime at Sea: Admiralty Sessions and the Background to Later Colonial Jurisdiction”
(1984) 8:3 DLJ 43.

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Schulich Law Scholars. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dalhousie Law Journal by an authorized editor of Schulich Law Scholars. For more
information, please contact hannah.steeves@dal.ca.

Crime at Sea: Admiralty Sessions and
the Background to Later Colonial
Jurisdiction
M. J. Prichard*

The conference program describes the legal history of Nova Scotia
as terraincognita.Whether this is so for the province's own inhabitants
is not a question that someone from the other side of the Atlantic should
presume to judge, since ignorance there is not limited to the legal history
of Nova Scotia but extends to colonial legal history generally. We have,
I fear, been intimidated by the task, and we have tended to leave each
erstwhile colony to trace its own legal history. I comfort myself, therefore, with the thought that any transatlantic contribution is likely to be a
modest one taking the form of a topic of English legal history in the hope
of prompting a corresponding interest in the history of that topic in
Nova Scotia. Since Nova Scotia is a maritime province, a maritime topic
may not be amiss-some problems of jurisdiction in respect of crimes
committed at sea that England experienced in the century or so before
and after the founding of Halifax. The problems, such as they were, were
experienced in Admiralty Sessions, for it was in Admiralty Sessions that
crime at sea was tried for the three centuries between 1536 and 1834.
Very little has ever been published about Admiralty Sessions. Holdsworth has barely a couple of pages upon them in the sixteen volumes of
his History ofEnglish Law-yet the records have a unique character and
are of interest to the social and economic historian as well as the lawyer.
Admiralty Sessions must be sharply distinguished from the
Admiralty Court, which had been in existence since the fourteenth
century, for 150 years before the creation of Admiralty Sessions. The
Admiralty Court administered Roman civil law in the form of the
customary marine laws, and it was staffed and served by lawyers trained
exclusively in the Roman civil law, not the English common law; these
lawyers, the advocates and proctors, formed a legal profession that was
totally distinct from that of the-common law. From its earliest days the
Admiralty Court excited the envy and enmity of the common law, and,
from as early as the reign of Richard II, statute had excluded the Lord
High Admiral from adjudication "of all manner of contracts, pleas and
*

Michael J. Prichard, LL.B., M.A., is Fellow and Lecturer of Gonville and Caius
College and University Lecturer in Law, Cambridge University.

43

44

LAW IN A COLONIAL SOCIETY

quarrels and all other things rising within the bodies of the counties as
well by land as by water."' Those matters were to be tried by the
common law courts and not elsewhere. The only concession to the
admiral was a jurisdiction over homicides and mayhem done in great
ships being and hovering in the main stream of great rivers below the
first bridge. The Admiralty Court did claim and exercise jurisdiction in
crime prior to 1536, but even by that date it had become predominantly
a civil court. Its heyday was the sixteenth century. By the middle of the
seventeenth century it had lost most of its civil jurisdiction, particularly
its profitable jurisdiction over commercial contracts made on land at
home or abroad. From then till its statutory revival in the mid-nineteenth century, it had to confine itself largely to bottomry, collisions and
seamen's wages. The only thing that saved the civilians' profession from
economic extinction in the eighteenth century was their work in the
Prize Courts, particularly during the wars that played so great a part in
the early history of Nova Scotia. The struggle between the Admiralty
Court and the common law did, however, leave its mark upon the
jurisdiction of Admiralty Sessions.
Admiralty Sessions owe their existence to the great statutes 27
Hen. 8, c. 4 and 28 Hen. 8, c. 15. The earlier statute had an elaborate
preamble explaining the deficiencies of trial by civil law process in a
manner typical of Henrician legislation. It lamented that pirates,
robbers, and murderers at sea go unpunished because there can only be
conviction by civil law either on confession (not usually obtainable
without torture) or by proof of witnesses (not usually left alive by
pirates). The later Act re-enacted with significant amendments the
substantive provisions of the earlier Act and provided that all treasons,
felonies, robberies, murders, and confederacies committed upon the sea
or in any other haven, river, or creek, or place where the admirals have
or pretend to have jurisdiction shall thereafter be tried by commission
directed to the admiral or his deputy and three or four other persons.
The trial was to be by the common course of the laws of the land, and the
commission was to designate the shire from which the grand and petty
juries were to be drawn. The Act thus substituted for the ineffectual civil
law process the same process as was used for the trial of indictable
offences within the realm, but with the difference that a commission
under 28 Hen. 8, c. 15, could be executed wherever the lord chancellor
chose, which came to be normally the Old Bailey by 1700; whereas
common law commissions had to visit the county or place covered by
their commission and could not call a jury from outside the county. The
statutory commission was, moreover, limited to capital offences; no
provision was made for misdemeanours until 1799.2
1. 15 Ric. 2, c. 3.
2. Offences at Sea Act, 1799, 39 Geo. 3, c. 37, s. 1.
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Jurisdiction in Admiralty Sessions was thus exercised not by a
court with a continuous existence but, as in other criminal cases, by
commissioners appointed from time to time. It was the sittings of these
commissioners that are known as Admiralty Sessions. Trial was by the
common law, and common law judges were always included in the
commission. By the eighteenth century, though not always earlier, at
least one common law judge was invariably present for any trial, though
not normally at other stages of the proceedings. Trial was by the
common law, but, since there was no permanent court, the sessions were
served by the staff of the Admiralty Court, in particular by the admiralty
registrar and the admiralty marshal. The effective recording of the
proceedings (as distinct from the formal record kept in common law
style) was undertaken by the admiralty registrar or his deputy. The
records of Admiralty Sessions thus display a Roman law civilian
character with "Acts" and, most important of all, examination books
(1537-1776) containing the examinations of the accused and the interrogations of witnesses. 3 The fact that the records were kept by the staff
of a permanent court gave them a continuity that is lacking for other
criminal jurisdictions until a relatively late date. Since the admiralty
marshal was the court's principal executive officer, the preserved
records also contain, for trials in London, the accompanying documents
relating to the processes both prior to and subsequent upon the trial,
such as the proclamation of sessions posted on the pillars of the Royal
Exchange and the warrants for execution between high and low water
mark at Execution Dock at the first bend of the Thames below London
Bridge. The records of Admiralty Sessions are thus remarkable for their
hybrid character, their continuity, and the variety of the non-legal
information that they contain, particularly the examinations in which
one can find details varying from, for example, early voyages of discovery4 to the symptoms of the diseases that afflicted the crew and
human cargo of convict ships on their way to Botany Bay.5 The latter
details would derive from the charges of brutality and murder brought
against the master or mate of such ships. I am informed that Halifax was
once considered as a possible site for a penal colony, but, if it had
become one, I imagine that hypothermia rather than tropical diseases
would have featured in accounts of corresponding voyages.
During the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, for the first
hundred years of its existence, the Sessions were kept busy both in
3. The records of Admiralty Sessions are preserved as H.C.A. I in the records of the
High Court of Admiralty in the Public Record Office, London. The calendar to
H.C.A. I contains a valuable introduction to the records by L. Bell.
4. See, e.g., the voyage of the Barbara to Brazil, (1540) H.C.A. 1/33/180, ed. R.
Marsden, Navy Records Society, vol. 40.
5. See, e.g., Kimber (1792), H.C.A. 1/85/72 (death on a slaver); Trail and Etherington
(1792), H.C.A. 1/85/74,75 (death on a convict ship).
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London and in the maritime counties dealing with piracies in local
waters. The State Papers of Elizabeth I show, though, that the piracies
that came to trial represented only the tip of a very large iceberg. A
technical problem of jurisdiction, similar to those we are to examine,
prevented legal process from being an effective weapon in the fight
against piracy. The real villains who had to be stamped out were not so
much the pirates themselves as the men who furnished the ships, and
the victuallers and receivers. Such aiders and abettors were tried at
Admiralty Sessions from time to time; 6 the common law disputed the
legality of such proceedings, yet washed its hands ofjurisdiction on the
grounds that piracy was not an offence known to the common law and
accessories could not exist without principals. 7 The problem of
accessories was not adequately tackled by statute until 1700, by which
time piracy in home waters had diminished very greatly indeed.8 Piracy
iure gentium had become a colonial problem.
By the middle of the seventeenth century the Admiralty Court itself
had lost its struggle with the common law courts and by the end of that
century Admiralty Sessions had, as we shall see, also surrendered its
jurisdiction in rivers and other national waters. In the eighteenth
century the commissioners' work in peace time was largely confined to
homicides at sea and the growing number of statutory piracies (particularly the wilful destruction of ships in the course of insurance frauds). At
the very end of the century misdemeanours were also brought within
their jurisdiction. The frequency with which Sessions were summoned
dwindled and this was a very real hardship to those charged with, for
example, homicide, who might have to wait for more than a year for
trial. War usually brought an increase in work, and it became standard
practice to include in the Prize Acts passed at the formal outbreak ofwar
a clause requiring Admiralty Sessions to be held twice a year. 9 The
requirement ceased when the particular Prize Act lapsed. With the long
peace that followed the Napoleonic Wars, Admiralty Sessions became a
picturesque but expensive anomaly; in 1834 a concurrent jurisdiction
was conferred upon the newly created Central Criminal Court at the Old
Bailey and in 1844 upon all commissioners of oyer and terminer and
gaol delivery and, thus, at Assizes outside London.10 Since that time no
special Admiralty Sessions have been held; but it is only within the last
twenty years that 28 Hen. 8, c. 15, has been removed from the statute
6. Accessories were not infrequently indicted with their principals in the reigns of
Elizabeth Iand James I; they might also be indicted separately, e.g., H.C.A. 1/5/166.
7. The Case of the Admiralty (1609), 10 Co. Rep. 51 at 53.
8. Piracy Act, 1698, 11 & 12 Will. 3, c. 7, ss. 9, 10.
9. The practice started in 1759 (32 Geo. 2, c. 25, s. 20). It was regarded as "quite
unnecessary in time of peace"; H.C.A. 1/62/271.
10. Central Criminal Court Act, 1834,4 & 5 Will. 4, c. 36, s. 22; Admiralty Offences Act,
1844, 7 & 8 Vict., c. 2.
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book." Its repeal evoked some nostalgia among those who have
ventured into the records of Admiralty Sessions.
The statute 28 Hen. 8, c. 15, dominated the question ofjurisdiction
throughout the three hundred years of Admiralty Sessions' existence.
When the jurisdictional issues came to be contested in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, the common lawyers were willing to allow the
admiral, and thus Admiralty Sessions, jurisdiction on the high sea,
super altum mare. The boundary of the high sea was generally the
water's edge, and that edge moved with the tide. Below low water mark
the sea was exclusively within the admiral's jurisdiction. Above high
water mark the common law alone was applicable. Within the ebb and
flow of the tide was divisum imperium, not in the sense of concurrent
2
jurisdiction at any one time, but in the sense of alternate phases.'
This provided a clear enough answer to any question ofjurisdiction
upon the open coast but left considerable problems over indentations,
estuaries, tidal inlets, and the like. The statute of 1536 provided that the
specified offences should be tried by commissioners of oyer and
terminer authorized by that Act not only when they had been committed
on the sea but also when they were committed in any other haven, river,
or creek, or place where the admiral or admirals have or pretend to have
power, authority, or jurisdiction. The phrase "have or pretend to have"
showed a subtle change from the simple "pretend to have" in the earlier
Act, 27 Hen. 8, c. 4. It made it more difficult to deny the statutory
commissioners any jurisdiction over havens, rivers, and creeks, but at
the same time it made it easier for the common lawyers to concede such
jurisdiction to the commissioners under the statute without thereby
making any concession as to the jurisdiction of the admiral himself. For
it was over civil and commercial litigation, the instance jurisdiction of
the admiralty, that the common lawyers and the civilians were mainly
embattled; the fate of the criminal jurisdiction was not a matter of great
contest. Nevertheless, despite the express words of the statute, Coke and
his common law colleagues were not willing to allow to the commissioners any jurisdiction in havens, rivers, creeks, or other arms of the sea
within the body of a county. Coke's attitude derived from his desire to
confine admiralty jurisdiction in all respects, criminal as well as civil, to
the narrowest interpretation of the statutes of Richard II. Since the Act
of 28 Hen. 8, c. 15, linked the jurisdiction of the commissioners
appointed under it with that of the admiral, however loosely, Coke was
unwilling to allow any jurisdiction within the body of a county to the
commissioners, lest it might seem to imply a concession to the admiral
himself. 3
I1. Criminal Law Act, 1967, s. 10, sch. 3, pt. 1.
12. Sir Henry Constable's Case (1601), 5 Co. Rep. 106a.
13. 3 Co. Inst. 113; Marsh (1615), 3 Bulst. 27 at 28.
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Despite Coke's view the commissioners at Admiralty Sessions tried
felonies committed in havens, rivers, and creeks for a hundred years
after the passing of the Henrician statute.' 4 They continued to do so for a
short time after the civil wars and the Restoration of 1660, but it is clear
that such cases were by then commonly referred to ordinary county
sessions of oyer and terminer and gaol delivery for trial by judges on
circuit in the ordinary course of common law.
The crucial case was that of the Woolstealers in 1672;15 it marked
the end of the use of statutory commissioners under 28 Hen. 8, c. 15, to
try crime committed upon salt water within the body of a county. Two
persons had been arrested in a boat in the Thames Estuary in the act of
illegal exportation of wool. The statute prohibiting exportation directed
trial of the offenders in the county either where the wool was packed or
where the offenders were arrested. There was no evidence of where the
wool was packed. The Privy Council sought the advice of the common
law judges and Sir Leoline Jenkins, the admiralty judge, whether the
offenders ought to be tried at Admiralty Sessions or by ordinary
common law sessions of gaol delivery in Essex or Kent. Jenkins relied on
the express wording of 28 Hen. 8, c. 18, but the common law judges flatly
denied that the offence was triable by Admiralty Sessions. The Thames
off Gravesend was still within the body of the counties of Essex and Kent
and, therefore, outside admiralty jurisdiction; the offence could not be
tried by commissioners of oyer and terminer under 28 Hen. 8, c. 15. In so
doing the judges may have been following Coke's opinion, but it is
possible that their principal ground was a narrow one, that the statute
creating the offence specified a particular county of trial which was
incompatible with, and therefore excluded, trial under 28 Hen. 8, c. 15.
Jenkins' arguments, though powerful, were not accepted, and thereafter
Admiralty Sessions heard and decided no cases of river crimes, except
such as came within the proviso to 15 Ric. 2, c. 3.
Abandonment to ordinary common law sessions of felonies committed on rivers meant that Admiralty Sessions in the eighteenth
century had no hand in dealing with the ever-growing volume of crime
on the Thames. Instead of pursuing a calling of piracy on the high seas, it
was simpler to wait for ships to reach the Thames and plunder them
there. The practice gave rise to a vocabulary of its own--"river pirates,"
"night plunderers," "light-horsemen," "mudlarks," "ratcatchers"-and
eventually led to the establishment of Colquhoun's River Police. 16 A
statute in 1751 attributed the increase in robbery and thefts on navigable
14. Some of the indictments are examined by Exton in his MaritimeDicaeologie,book 2,
chapter 17.
15. Nicholls and Husse; Wynne, Life of Jenkins, vol. 2 at 746; All Souls MSS, 206 f.6;
215 f.16.
16. See Radzinowicz, History of English CriminalLaw andits Administration,vol. 2,pp.
349-404.
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rivers and ports to the existence of benefit of clergy; it provided that
persons stealing goods, wares, or merchandise, of the value of 40
shillings in any ship, barge, lighter, boat, or other vessel or craft upon
any navigable river, or in any port of entry or discharge, or in any creek
belonging to any navigable river or port of duty or discharge should be
excluded from benefit of clergy. 7 First offenders could no longer avoid
sentence of death. Ironically, benefit of clergy had never been allowed at
Admiralty Sessions.
At this point it is desirable to consider the views of Sir Mathew
Hale, which became influential later in the eighteenth century after the
publication of The History of the Pleasof the Crown. Hale agreed with
Coke in excluding the admiral from any jurisdiction over felonies
committed within a creek or arm of the sea that was within the body of a
county, except where the proviso in 15 Ric. 2, c. 3, allowed him to try
cases of homicide and mayhem. But, unlike Coke, he was prepared to
allow the commissioners under 28 Hen. 8, c. 15, jurisdiction over
offences specified in the Act not only on the sea but also in "great rivers,
where the sea flows and reflows below the first bridges, and also in
creeks of the sea at full water, where the sea flows and reflows, and upon
high water upon the shore, tho these possibly be within the body of the
county, for there, at least, by the statute of 15 R. 2, they have a jurisdiction, and thus accordingly it hath been constantly used at all times, even
judges of the common law have been named and sat in their commission;
• "18

During the eighteenth century Coke's view was, however, paramount and it prevailed. Both Hawkins and East state without hesitation
that jurisdiction under 28 Hen. 8, c. 15, did not extend into the body of a
county.19 The proviso to 15 Ric. 2, c. 3, was conceded, but even here the
jurisdiction was only concurrent with, not exclusive of, the common
law. In the field of legislation it was usual in creating maritime felonies
to restrict admiralty jurisdiction to the high sea and to direct all such
offences committed within the bodies of counties to be triable at
common law.
But in 1812 the twelve judges in R. v. Bruce declared Hale's view as
to the extent of 28 Hen. 8, c. 15, was to be "much preferred." 20 Bruce had
been indicted at Admiralty Sessions for the murder of a ferry boy in
Milford Haven and the judges sustained the conviction. They were
unanimous "that there was no objection to the conviction on the ground
of any supposed want ofjurisdiction in the commissioners appointed by
17. 24 Geo. 2, c. 45.
18. M. Hale, The History of the Pleas of the Crown, vol. 2 at 17.
19. Hawkins, Pleasof the Crown, vol. Iat 154(1787 ed.); East, Pleasof the Crown, vol.2,
803.
20. Bruce (1812), 2 Leach 1093; Russ. & Ry. 243.
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commission in respect of the place where the offence was committed."
They considered the trial perfectly valid, though the offence had been
committed within the body of the county of Pembroke. There seems no
reason to suppose that R. v. Bruce was not good law then or later. It is
true that Cockburn, C.J. assumed in R. v. Keyn that jurisdiction under
28 Hen. 8, c. 15, could not extend to waters within the bodies of any
county, but it is evident that he did not have R. v. Bruce in mind when
21
delivering his opinion.
Drawing the boundary between the jurisdictions of Admiralty
Sessions and of the ordinary criminal courts of the county raised also as
a problem that may seem quaint but had a social significance. This was
the problem of crimes committed both on land and on the sea. In his
Pleas of the Crown22 Hale writes of the presentment of criminal charges
to general commissioners of oyer and terminer: "The grand jury are
sworn ad inquirendumpro corpore comitatz2s, and therefore regularly
they cannot enquire of a fact done out of that county for which they are
sworn, unless specially enabled by act of parliament, but only in some
special cases." Having discussed problems involving cases where, for
example, wounding occurs in one county but death ensues in another, he
adds: "So if a stroke were given super altum mare, and the party came
into the body of the county, and there died, this is casus omissus, and the
party is neither indictable by the jury of the county where he died, nor
before the admiral, by the statute of 28 H.8, cap. 15." This proposition is
based on Lacy's Case which is thus described by Coke: 23 "And a case was
adjudged in this Court [King's Bench], Trin, 25 Eliz. in Lacy's case, that
whereas Lacy struck Peacock, and gave him a mortal wound upon the
sea, of which Peacock died at Scarborough, in the county of York, and
Lacy was discharged of it; for those of the county of York could not
enquire of his death, without inquiry of the stroke, and of the blow they
could not enquire, because it was not given in any county; and those of
the Admiral jurisdiction, could not, as of a felony, enquire of the stroke,
without enquiry of the death, and they could not enquire of the death,
because it was infra corpus comitatus."
Hale subsequently changed his mind on this question after an
exhaustive analysis of the commission issued to the justices of the admiralty in Lacy's Case. Basing himself on a theory that the commissioners
were by their commission equipped not only with jurisdiction conferred
by 28 Hen. 8, c. 15, but also with common law powers to try maritime
offences, Hale came to the conclusion that the killing in Lacy's Case was
not dispunishable. His view, however, was of no practical consequence
because, when a similar case arose in 1729, Parliament passed an Act
21. Keyn (1876), 2 Ex. D. 63, 232-235.
22. Vol. 2, 163.
23. In Bingham's Case (1601), 2 Co. Rep. at 93a, [16 E.R. 616].

1750CRIMEATSEA

51

which made murder committed in this way triable in the county where
death occurred by an ordinary commission of oyer and terminer. 24 The
Act dealt both with the case where the blow was given on land and death
ensued at sea or abroad, and the case where the blow was given at sea or
abroad and death ensued on land. In each case the English county where
wounding or death occurred was the venue for trial at common law, and
Admiralty Sessions were excluded from jurisdiction.
Lacy's Case was quaint. The real significance of the problem lies in
the case where the mortal blow was given by a ship's master or mate to a
member of the crew or vice versa. Such cases of death resulting from
excessively harsh discipline or violent insubordination might, of course,
arise upon foreign ships as much as upon British ships. The Act of 1729
did not state that the part of the crime done at sea must be within the
jurisdiction of the admiral; it was, therefore, open to argument that the
Act applied even where the injury or death occurred upon a foreign
vessel on the high seas. After all, the Act applied where the injury or
death occurred on foreign soil, so why not where it occurred on a foreign
ship? In the middle of the nineteenth century this view was rejected, and
it was held that the Act (as re-enacted and extended to manslaughter in
182825) was "obviously intended to prevent a defeat of justice which,
without it, might have arisen, from the difficulty of trial, in cases of
homicide where the death occurs in a different place from that at which
the blow causing it was given, and that the section ought not therefore to
be construed as making a homicide cognizable in the Courts of this
country by reason only of the death occurring here, unless it would have
been so cognizable in case the death had ensued at the place where the
blow was given, . ...
,26 Jurisdiction to enquire into cases of excessively
harsh discipline by the master or violent insubordination by the crew of
foreign ships calling subsequently at British ports was abandoned.
However, where blows were struck in foreign ports upon members of the
crew of British ships who later died on ship, jurisdiction was preserved,
27
as the cases of Trail and Etherington and of Jemmott will show.
The Acts of 1729 and 1828 did not make any provision for similar
cases arising in the colonies, even though persons wounded at sea were
no doubt landed in the colonies and died there on occasion. Such cases
were not triable, at least in strict theory, until the Admiralty Offences
(Colonial) Act, 1849, 12 & 13 Vict., c. 96, and the Admiralty Offences
(Colonial) Act, 1860, 23 & 24 Vict., c. 122, were passed. The primary
purpose of the 1849 Act was to confer admiralty criminal jurisdiction
upon the ordinary criminal courts of a colony. It also provided that,
24.
25.
26.
27.

2 Geo. 2, c. 21. The case was Price (1729), H.C.A. 1/18/95, 104, 127.
9 Geo. 4, c. 31, s. 8.
R. v. Lewis (1857), Dears. & B. 182 [169 E.R. 968].
See infra.
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where any person should die in a colony after being feloniously stricken
at sea or abroad, the offence might be dealt with as if it had been wholly
committed in the colony, and that if any person should die at sea after
being feloniously stricken, the offence should be held for the purposes of
the Act to have been wholly committed at sea. At first sight the latter
provision might appear to have given jurisdiction to the admiral, but in
fact it did not, since jurisdiction in both situations was conferred upon
the ordinary criminal courts of the colony.
The Act of 1729 and its successors did not deal with all types of
homicides committed partly on land and partly at sea; instead, it dealt
only with the problem that arose where the blow was struck in one jurisdiction and death occurred in another. It left untouched the situation
where the blow itself was extended over two jurisdictions as, for
example, where a shot is fired from land and kills someone at sea. Such a
case arose in the colonies in 1725,28 and the law officers advised that such
a killing was within the jurisdiction of the admiralty. The matter was
finally settled later in the century by the common law judges in the case
of Coombes in 1785, in which it was held that a smuggler who from land
had fired at and killed a revenue officer at sea might properly be tried for
murder at Admiralty Sessions. 29 The judges were careful to decide
merely that the prisoner had been "tried by a competent jurisdiction,"
and not, as has sometimes been suggested, that the courts of common
law had no jurisdiction.
The question of admiralty jurisdiction over offences committed in
foreign rivers and ports appears not to have raised the same violent
disagreement that arose over arms of the sea in England. At the height of
the controversy between the common law and the admiralty at the beginning of the seventeenth century, the common lawyers did indeed seek to
exclude the admiral from any jurisdiction over matters arising in foreign
ports and havens even when they were "out of the King's dominions."
Exclusion was sought not because the matters arose within the body of a
county but because "the admiral is for the sea, and the Court for
maritime cases" and the jurisdiction of the admiral was limited "by the
statutes" [of Richard II?] to the seas only and "no port is part of the sea,
but of the continent." 30 This argument was, however, directed against
the civil jurisdiction of the admiral in respect of contracts concluded in
foreign ports and was never pressed in connection with the criminal
jurisdiction either of the admiral or of the commissioners. The civilians'
view of the extent of admiralty jurisdiction appears to have prevailed
unchallenged during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in
criminal cases. Such cases were never common and, indeed, only one has
28. Forsyth, Cases and Opinions on ConstitutionalLaw, p. 219 [hereinafter Forsyth].
29. (1785), 1 Leach 388.
30. Don Diego de Acuna v. Joliff and Tucker Hob. 78, 79.
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been noticed in the eighteenth century: that of a "melancholy accident"
in 1776 in which a sailor was drowned during a struggle with the mate
while the ship was in the River Tagus. 3' There are hints also that the
admiralty lawyers may have been willing in the case of foreign ports to
exercise jurisdiction to the extreme limits that had been claimed in
Lacy's Case, namely, to the high water mark, even when the tide was not
in, and also in respect of offences committed partly at sea and partly on
land.
A case in 1792 raised the question of offences committed partly on
land and partly at sea. Donald Trail and William Etherington, the
master and mate of the Neptune, a convict ship, were charged at
Admiralty Sessions with the murder of the ship's cook at Macao on the
way to Botany Bay.32 According to the minutes of the session the killing
was said to have occurred "in the Neptune," but the informationsbesides revealing other instances of gross brutality on the ship-suggest
that, although the blows may have been struck on board ship, death may
have occurred on land "in the Hospital at Macoa." Both the accused
were acquitted, not as a result of any doubt as to jurisdiction, for the
question was never taken, but as a result, it would seem, of the prevailing
reluctance to convict any ship's officers of murder where death occurred
as a result of conduct which, though excessively brutal, might be looked
upon as disciplinary.
Ironically, the first suggestion that the criminal jurisdiction of the
admiral did not extend to foreign ports or rivers came not from a
common lawyer but from a civilian. In an undated opinion as king's
advocate, Marriott affirmed the jurisdiction of the admiralty of England
over offences committed on the high seas, but expressed the view "that
when murders or felonies are committed in any port, river, creek, or
haven of the territory of any foreign power, those crimes do then fall
under that particular local and territorial jurisdiction, which jurisdiction is always understood to reach as far as the power of protection
reaches-that is to say, within the command of gunshot from the shore,
for the power of punishment is always equal to and coincident with and
inseparable from the power of protection."33 This opinion reflects the
influence of the development in international law of notions of the
sovereignty and exclusive jurisdiction of a state over its own territory; it
is not surprising that such notions should first find their expression in
England in civilians rather than in common lawyers.
Lord Stowell, however, did not share Marriott's view; for when an
English sailor, William Jemmott, was indicted in 1812 for larceny on
board a British [?] ship in a natural harbour in Cuba, and an objection to
31. Kidd (1776), H.C.A. 1159132ff.
32. Trail and Etherington (1792), H.C.A. 1/61/66, 176; 1/85/75, 206.
33. Forsyth, supra, note 28, p. 217.
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the jurisdiction was taken by his counsel, Gurney, the court, consisting
of Sir William Scott and Le Blanc, J., ruled that "there was no doubt
upon the subject and the Court had clearly a jurisdiction in respect of
offences committed in all foreign harbours and waters as well as on the
High Sea:" Jemmott was, accordingly convicted and sentenced to
death. 34 Some doubt, however, seems to have been felt, either on the
question of jurisdiction or, more probably, on the question of benefit of
clergy, for Jemmott was respited four times after being ordered for
execution and appears to have escaped the gallows. Despite the growth
in international law of the notion that a state has exclusive jurisdiction
within its own territory, the principle that admiralty criminal
jurisdiction extends to foreign harbours and rivers has been reiterated
on several occasions since the jurisdiction was transferred to the
common law courts.
The problem of jurisdiction over foreigners and foreign ships
probably, troubled the colonies little, if we may judge from the infrequency with which it troubled Admiralty Sessions before the nineteenth
century. The statute 28 Hen. 8, c. 15, specified the various kinds of
offences to which it extended and the waters in which they might be
committed; but it said nothing about the offender or about the ship, if
any, on which the offences took place. Clearly there was no consciousness of a problem and no thought that anything need be said on the
matter: offences that were previously triable before the admiral were
now to be tried by commission. Admiralty Sessions was thus left to work
out its own principles of jurisdiction over foreigners for acts done upon
the high seas, and throughout its history it seems, consciously or
unconsciously, to have observed a "law of the flag": it assumed
jurisdiction over acts done on English (and subsequently British) ships,
whether they were done by subjects or by foreigners, but made no
attempt to exercise jurisdiction over acts done on foreign ships. To the
latter part of this rule there were exceptions, but to the first half no
exception was ever made as a matter of law, though the question of
nationality may of course have influenced the question of prosecution
on occasion. The indictment did not have to specify the nationality of
the prisoner: it was enough that the offence was committed on a British
ship. The question excited so little comment at Admiralty Sessions that
it is difficult to find any case in which the jurisdiction was challenged,
though there have been several cases since 1834 in which the point has
been raised. In 1807, in R. v. Depardo,the prosecution had no difficulty
in producing recent instances of prosecutions of foreigners at Admiralty
Sessions for offences committed on British ships on the high seas. 35 The
nationality of the prisoner was, however, relevant in one respect, since a
34. H.C.A. 1161/471.
35. (1807), 1 Taunt. 26. The case was not tried at Admiralty Sessions.
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foreigner had the right to a jury de medietate linguae, that is, to a jury
comprised half of subjects and half of foreigners. But, since the accused
could not specify the nationality of the foreigners to be chosen and had
no say in their selection, he almost invariably waived his right.
The rule that admiralty jurisdiction does not extend to acts done on
foreign ships has always been subject to exceptions. The first and by far
the most important of these was universally recognized: piracy. The
pirate was regarded as hostis humanigeneris,the common enemy of all
nations and subject to the jurisdiction of all equally. He fell to be tried by
the state that caught him; no doctrine of renvoi was admitted, and it was
the almost invariable practice of England, as of others, to reject any
requests for the surrender of a pirate to stand trial in his own country.
Any other practice would not have been tolerated by the merchants he
had despoiled, since one of their few chances of redress was to bargain
with a condemned pirate for his life. In the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries piracy was by far the commonest offence tried at Admiralty
Sessions, so that the exception effectively concealed the rule from sight;
indeed, there is so little evidence of any conscious thought about the
matter that it would be wrong to talk of a "rule." The question would
rarely arise. Unless the offence had repercussions outside the vessel,
there was no reason why Admiralty Sessions should take cognizance of
offences committed on foreign vessels on the high seas, and in any case
such offences were very unlikely to be brought to the attention of the
English authorities. No master or owner of a foreign vessel would
willingly court the inevitable delay and cost that attended criminal
proceedings. In port there might be more reason to take jurisdiction, but
there would doubtless be the same reluctance to report the matter. Apart
from piracy there would appear to be no more than a half dozen cases,
during the three centuries of the court's existence, in which Admiralty
Sessions exercised jurisdiction over acts done by foreigners on foreign
ships on the high seas. All but one of these occurred during the reign of
Charles II in the years immediately following the Third Dutch War and,
arising as they did out of Stuart pretensions to sovereignty of the British
36
seas, they were largely political in character.
In general the immunity from admiralty criminal jurisdiction of
foreign ships upon the high seas would extend to British subjects upon
such ships. British subjects could, however, render themselves liable to
prosecution at Admiralty Sessions by the very act of serving on a foreign
vessel in two ways: by serving on a foreign warship or privateer in
hostilities against countries with which Britain was at peace, and by
serving on such ships against Britain or its allies in time of war. The
36. Most notable were the prosecutions of foreigners for failure to strike their flag and
lower their topsails upon meeting royalships in the British seas, e.g., Christian Bartlot
(1675), H.C.A. 1/10/29.
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latter offence was, of course, the more serious one, amounting generally
to high treason, though punishable also as a statutory piracy. Such cases
were not uncommon in the later eighteenth century. Prosecution for the
service on a foreign privateer in times of peace was rare; in the absence of
any Foreign Enlistment Act, it was treated as an offence at common law,
at any rate when done in defiance of a royal proclamation.
Smuggling offences might perhaps be expected to provide instances
in which foreigners were tried for acts committed on foreign ships on the
high seas, since the statutes against illegal exporting and importing
frequently prohibited acts which might be done as well upon the high
seas as in ports or on the coast and as well by foreigners as by subjects. In
fact, however, very few smuggling offences were ever tried at Admiralty
Sessions. The Hovering Acts of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries gave rise to one important case at Admiralty Sessions, which
emphasized the limits within which those Acts applied to foreign
vessels. 37 Those Acts authorized a measure of visitation, inspection,
and, where appropriate, seizure of vessels hovering off the coast with
customable and prohibited goods within specified distances. The
distances were progressively extended from two leagues to one hundred
leagues. The Acts extended to ships that belonged in whole or in part to
British subjects and to ships of which a proportion of the crew were
British subjects; it could thus apply to foreign vessels within the specified
number of leagues if they were partly owned by a British subject or had a
sufficient number of British subjects among the crew. For this reason the
Hovering Acts have been regarded as an exception to the general principle of the freedom of the high seas. Lord Stowell, describing the limits
of the Acts as "more or less moderately assigned," justified them as an
exception allowed by the "common courtesy of nations ... for their
'38
common convenience.
The hovering laws were exceptional, and regarded as such, and it
was well recognized in the eighteenth century that felonies created by
statute, even though of a specifically marine character, were part of
English municipal law and did not extend to foreign vessels upon the
high seas. Thus, it was clearly conceded that the statutory felony of wilfully destroying a vessel in order to defraud its owner or insurer could
not be committed by the destruction of a foreign ship on the high seas by
its (foreign) master. 39 If any doubts lingered, they were laid to rest by the
well-known case of the Franconiaforty years after the holding of
40
Admiralty Sessions was discontinued.
37. Marinel Krans (1823), H.C.A. 1/611739. See Ld Teignmouth and C. Harper, The
Smugglers (1923), vol. 1 at 133.
38. The Le Louis (1817), 2 Dodson 210 at 245.
39. de Loredo (1765), H.C.A. 1/61/19; East P.C. 11 at 1098.
40. Keyn (1876), 2 Ex. D. 63.
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It is not the purpose of this paper to do more than touch upon a few
of the jurisdictional issues that presented themselves in England during
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Many of those issues evolved
out of the interplay of three distinct jurisdictions: the common law
courts and commissions, the Admiralty Court, and Admiralty Sessions.
For a period of 150 years, in the eighteenth and first half of the nineteenth century, there existed, for the colonies, a similar tripartite
judicature: just as the local colonial courts and the vice-admiralty courts
were the counterparts of the common law courts and commissions and
the Admiralty Court respectively, so various statutory experiments were
the counterpart of Admiralty Sessions. It may not be out of place by way
of postscript to note the extent to which these statutory experiments
were shaped by the experience of Admiralty Sessions. The problem of
exercising admiralty criminal jurisdiction in colonial and other distant
waters first presented itself after the Restoration; 4' the effort of bringing
prisoners back for trial led to an attempt to try them locally by viceadmirals exercising the extra-statutory authority of the Lord High
Admiral.42 The prevailing legal opinion, however, appears to have been
that they could only be tried under the statute 28 Hen. 8, c. 15, and that
this statute had no application to the colonies. 43
A solution was provided by the statute 11 & 12 Will. 3, c. 7, in
1699. 44 Like 28 Hen. 8, c. 15, it provided for trial by commission, which
was to be directed to the governor and naval military and civil officers in
the locality; but unlike 28 Hen. 8, c. 15, it directed that trial was to be
by inquisitorial procedure, not by jury. For over a century the statute of
1699 furnished the counterpart of Admiralty Sessions for the colonies,
at any rate in legal theory, 45 though jury trial was also used after 1717.46
After its founding, Halifax was included among the places to which
commissions were issued, and it would be interesting to discover to what
extent the commissions to Halifax were utilized. 47 It is clear, however,
that the solution provided in 1699 was found to suffer from serious
defects, notably that it did not extend to murder, treason, or felonies
subsequently enacted. 48 In 1806 Parliament substituted for it a
procedure that reflected faithfully that of 28 Hen. 8, c. 15. Offences
committed upon the sea or in any haven, river, creek, or place where the
admiral or admirals have power, authority, or jurisdiction were to be
41. H.C.A. 30/587/13 (1661).
42. Forsyth, supra, note 28, p. 111.
43. See L. Bell's introduction to the H.C.A. I records, supra, note 3.

44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

s. 4.
Chalmers, Opinions of Eminent Lawyers, pp. 204, 219 [hereinafter Chalmers].
Bonnet (1718), 15 State Trials 1231 (trial by jury). Compare 4 Geo. I, c. 11, s. 7.
H.C.A. 1/64/32 (1761).
Chalmers, supra, note 45, p. 219(1761) but compare H.C.A. 1/64/43. See also H.C.A.
1/32/38 (1782), on the practical difficulties caused by the infrequency of commissions.
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tried by the common course of the laws of the realm for offences on land
and not otherwise in any colonies under commissions from the lord
chancellor as under 28 Hen. 8, c. 15. 49 This procedure outlived its
counterpart in England by a decade or so; but, just as separate Admiralty
Sessions were discontinued there after 1834, so in 1849, one hundred
years after the founding of Halifax, they were discontinued in the
colonies, and jurisdiction was transferred to the ordinary criminal
50
courts of the colony.

49. Offences at Sea Act, 1806, 46 Geo. 3, c. 54.
50. Admiralty Offences (Colonial) Act, 1849, 12 & 13 Vict., c. 96. See G. Marston, 14
U.B.C. L.R. 299 (1980).

